When disposing of a computer, you would like to be sure that it has no data on its storage that could be accessed by the direct recipient (or any future recipient). It would be somewhat embarrassing for personal photos to be retrieved; it would be far worse if financial or business data were to be left accessible.
The keywords you're looking for here are data remanence and disk sanitization.
There are three methods to remove data from a disk. Total physical destruction, degaussing, and overwriting the data. The effectiveness of these methods is up for debate; as is the feasibility of a sufficiently determined and well-funded attacker being able to retrieve data.
Here I'm just going to discuss overwriting the disk. For a lot of casual and home purposes that'll be enough, and is a lot better than not bothering at all, or simply reformatting the drive (or reinstalling on OS on it) which will leave a lot of disk sectors untouched and amenable to simply being read off in software.
The standard here seems to be DBAN. However, it's not seen much activity in a while, and was sold to a company that offers a commercial product that's claimed to be much better.
Basically, all DBAN is doing is scribbling over every sector on a drive. That's not hard.
In Solarish systems, format/analyze/purge does essentially the same thing. It's the documented method for wiping hard drives on Solarish style systems.
However, it's a little fiddly to use and requires a modest level of expertise to get that far. You can't purge the disk you're booted from, the solution proposed there is to boot from installation media, drop to a shell, and run format from there. That has a couple of problems - it's still very manual, and the install (or live) media are rather large and can take an age to boot.
So I started to think, how hard could it be to create a minimalist illumos boot media that just contains the format command, and a simple script around it to make it easy to run?
I've already done most of the work, as part of the minimal viable illumos project. It was pretty easy to create a new variant.
The idea is to erase disk drives, so the intended target is physical hardware rather than a hypervisor. So I added a number of common storage drivers to the image. (As an aside, I really have no idea as to what storage HBAs are actually in common use, so which drivers to put in this list or on the Tribblix install iso is largely guesswork.)
There should be no need for networking. You really don't want a mechanism for any external access to the system while the disks are being wiped, so networking is simply not there.
And I added a simple wrapper script that enumerates disk drives and runs the appropriate format commands. If you want to see how this works, just look at the wrapper script. All this is in the mvi repo, see the files with "wipe" in their names.
And there's the (14M in size) iso image I created also available.
(Why is such a small image good, you might ask? Apart from simply being sure that it's only capable of doing the one function that it's advertised for, if you're trying to wipe a remote system mounting the image over the network, then the smaller the better.)
I tested this in VirtualBox, which exposed a few quirks. For one, the defect list switching you'll see in the docs doesn't work there (I have no idea if it's going to work on any real hardware). The other is that the disk image I was using was a file on a compressed zfs file system. The purge process writes a repeating pattern, which is very compressible, so the 1G disk image I was testing only takes up 16M of disk space.
While I don't think it's really a proper alternative to DBAN, I think it's useful as a real-world example of how to use mvi.
2 comments:
What we need is a Solaris implementation of the ATA Secure Erase command set:
https://mackonsti.wordpress.com/2011/11/22/ssd-secure-erase-ata-command/
Nice work! I didn't know about format > analyze > purge. One time I used a Linux boot image with GNU Shred (slightly modified to have a larger, more efficient buffer size than the default).
Just for completeness, there is a fourth way to remove data: always use full disk encryption, and when you're finished, destroy the key.
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